On Affirming Marriage as a Lifelong Union

Canon Dr Angus Ritchie, like others, claims that

To remarry divorcees and to conduct same-sex marriages both go against the Primates' Communique, which affirms that marriage must be “between a man and a woman in faithful, lifelong union.”

This implies that the Church of England’s practice, which allows remarriage of divorcees in some circumstances, and its official doctrine as expressed in Canon B 30

The Church of England affirms, according to our Lord’s teaching, that marriage is in its nature a union permanent and lifelong, for better for worse, till death them do part, of one man with one woman, to the exclusion of all others on either side, for the procreation and nurture of children, for the hallowing and right direction of the natural instincts and affections, and for the mutual society, help and comfort which the one ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity.

Like others, Angus Ritchie is coy about spelling out what if anything is to be done about this contradiction. 

• Does it matter whether or not the Church acts in accordance with its beliefs?
• If so, should the Church  revert to its more rigorous practice of not allowing divorcees to get married in church?
• Or should the Church adapt doctrine to practice and abandon the doctrine that marriage is a lifelong union?

(Ritchie's general argument suggest to me that he would not be content with blatant contradiction between doctrine and practice and his endorsement of Jeffrey John's Permanent, Faithful, Stable suggests that he does not want to abandon the idea that marriage involves "faithful, lifelong union" but I am not aware of any efforts on his part to revert to a less liberal marriage practice in relation to divorcees.)

The claim that the practice of remarriage of divorcees is incompatible with the view that marriage is a lifelong union is presented as self-evident. But it can hardly be said to be self-evident. Why?

Because for at least one and a half millennia the Eastern Churches strongly affirmed that marriage is a lifelong union, while allowing for the possibility (and permissibility in some circumstances) of divorce with right of remarriage, appealing to Origen and Basil among others.

Because even within the Western Church this was rarely undisputed. There was a period of about 400 years from the Decretum of Gratian onwards during which (Christian!) marriage was held to be indissoluble without much contradiction but the issue was re-opened during the Reformation period. The Reformers abandoned the principle of absolute indissolubility for theological and pastoral reasons and “believed that in doing so, they were recalling the Church to the Scriptural teaching on marriage and divorce.” (Atkinson)*

Because in spite of the fact that the Church of England adopted the most stringent practice in all of Christendom, as far as mainstream churches are concerned anyway, a division of opinion on this matter has been characteristic of Anglican history.

All are (were?) agreed that God’s will for marriage is for it to be a permanent and lifelong union. The debate concerns whether the claim that marriage must be “between a man and a woman in faithful, lifelong union” expresses God’s design which can however be broken or whether a valid marriage once entered into on these terms is a “lifelong union” in the sense that it can ever be broken in God’s sight, whatever the civil authorities declare.

The claim that remarriage of divorcees invariably goes against the view that marriage is a lifelong union seems to presumes not only the view usually attributed to the Roman Catholic Church that sacramental marriage forms a bond which is only severed at death but also extends this principle to all marriages, whether they involve Christians or not. (See here a statement on why marriage that involves someone who is not baptised can be fully valid and even conducted in church without being sacramental according to Roman Catholic church law.)

In short, the assumption behind the claim that remarriage of divorcees goes against an affirmation that marriage must be “between a man and a woman in faithful, lifelong union” is highly controversial. To present the claim as self-evident betrays either an astonishing ignorance of other Christian views on the matter or a breathtakingly arrogant confidence that other views can be dismissed without even being mentioned.

An incumbent within the Church of England should not remain in such ignorance. For the benefit of anyone needing a crash-course in the discussion preceding the change in practice within the Church of England I have excerpted David Atkinson’s To Have and to Hold: The Marriage Covenant and the Discipline of Divorce (St James’s Place, London: Collins, 1979) in notes from chapter 1 (areas of disagreement), chapter 2 (historical sketch), chapter 3 (marriage as covenant), chapter 4 (background and biblical evidence), chapter 5 here (principles for a Christian view of divorce) and here (applications of these principles), and chapter 6 (the pastoral problem of divorce and remarriage). A more recent, very learned but not Anglican discussion can be found at http://www.divorce-remarriage.com/.

Quick summary:

(1) Some believe that no (Christian) marriage ever comes to an end in this life. This is the position usually identified with the Roman Catholic Church.
(2) Some believe that there are two ways in which a marriage can end, through death or through sin. This is the position of the Orthodox churches and of the Protestant Reformers.
(3) Some believe that there are many which in a marriage can end other than death and sin. This seems to be the most widespread view in Western society outside the church.

The phrase "lifelong union" means different things to different people.

• For those affirming (1) it describes an inescapable fact about marriage. 
• For those affirming (2) it says something about what marriage intrinsically is according to God's design which is however breakable, a bit like saying a house is a space with walls and roof does not imply that the roof cannot fall down.
• For those affirming 3) the phrase expresses at best an aspiration rather than something that marriage intrinsically is.

*Note Tudor Church Reform: The Henrician Canons of 1535 and the Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum (Boydell Press, 2000)

To Have and to Hold: Divorce and Remarriage, Pastoralia

The final chapter of David Atkinson’s To Have and to Hold: The Marriage Covenant and the Discipline of Divorce (St James’s Place, London: Collins, 1979) explores the pastoral problems of divorce and remarriage. See previous notes from chapter 1 (areas of disagreement), chapter 2 (historical sketch), chapter 3 (marriage as covenant), chapter 4 (background and biblical evidence), chapter 5 here (principles for a Christian view of divorce) and here (applications of these principles).

Atkinson notes that “divorce is often a symptom of a far deeper problem in contemporary society – for Christians as for others – than simply the personal failure of a particular couple within their marriage relationship” (p. 181) The problem is not addressed by simply making divorce as difficult as possible. “The pastoral problem for the Church...is how to foster and encourage the personal qualities which make for covenant-faithfulness and commitment, even within the pressures of contemporary society.” (p. 183)

“As Michael Pollitt rightly comments: ‘education for and within marriage is a much more urgent matter than the question of the remarriage of divorced people.’” (p. 184) Furthermore, without dismissing the role of other agencies, “it is the duty of the Church to be an agent of reconciliation” where there is a threat to a marriage. (p. 186) “Whatever the practical steps needed, the Church has a duty to make itself known, and inspire confidence in its value, as the agency within which the reconciling grace of God can become a reality in the strained relationships of marriage breakdown. And it must work towards establishing as a regular procedure, the use of that agency as a first resort by married couples at times of marital distress.” (p. 187)

When marriages are broken: “For too long the primary stance of the Church to people who have been divorced has been one of condemnation or rejection...The Christian community needs to learn how to express compassion towards the divorced person as ‘victim’ [not only agent of divorce].” (p. 188)

“Part of the pastoral question for the Church is to ask how best it can be an agency of support and acceptance to the victims of divorce. And the second pastoral question is how best the Church can aid the divorced person, and his or her family, in finding ‘the Father’s will’ for their future.” (p. 188) Atkinson elaborates this in terms of guilt and feelings of guilt, receiving and extending forgiveness, and “for some, but surely not all, the covenanted obligation of sexual exclusiveness may lead them to view their future life as divorcee as a calling to celibacy” (p. 189).

“The moral question of the propriety of repeating lifelong vows is not as central as some argue.” (p. 189) While failure to uphold a vow reduces one’s moral credibility, it does not preclude the genuine possibility to make another life-long vow with utter sincerity.

“Whereas, therefore, the moral question concerning the right of remarriage may be fairly clear, the pastoral question as to the Church’s role in such remarriage, in particular whether or not it should give its blessing to any particular remarriage, is much more complex. The Church has other needs to consider than only those of the couple concerned; it is here that the tension between the Church’s prophetic and pastoral callings can be most acute.” (p. 190)

“The practice of refusing to marry any divorced person with the Church’s blessing seems unfortunately to witness only to the fact that Church law must always come before personal need. And yet, of course, indiscriminate remarriage on demand would seem to speak of a God of cheap grace who is blind to sin. If the Church is to give its blessing to some who seek remarriage after divorce, it needs first to be sure that it is pastorally possible to operate a consistent, fair and adequate discrimination...The only feasible criteria on which the Church can decide whether or not it is appropriate to give its blessing concern not degrees of guilt, but present attitude.” (p. 191)

“The Church’s blessing for any marriage should be reserved only for those who share its view of marriage, and the condition (with respect to the couple) on which the Church’s blessing on second marriage should be decided, is penitence for past sin and a genuine desire to seek God’s grace for a new marriage which accords with his pattern.” (p. 191)

After exploring three options, Atkinson concludes: “Assuming that after pastoral consultation, the parish priest and the couple believe in conscience that it is appropriate to have a church service for their marriage – and, to aid the priest in his decision, a diocesan panel may well be a helpful advisory aid – it would appear that neither the Marriage Service as it stands, nor a Service of Blessing following civil marriage, gives adequate witness to the view that God’s will for marriage is for permanence, that divorce is sin, but that sin can be forgiven. The most satisfactory option appears to be a procedure which combines adequate pastoral preparation with a liturgical service which itself gives appropriate witness to the Church’s prophetic and pastoral roles. A form of service is needed, in which the marriage itself is included, which can act in a discriminatory way by expressing both God’s will for marriage and penitence for the sin of divorce. If both such facts are publicly declared in the liturgy itself, the important distinctions in the Church’s witness between first and second marriages can be maintained.” (p. 194)

To Have and to Hold: Divorce and Remarriage, Applications

In the fifth chapter of To Have and to Hold: The Marriage Covenant and the Discipline of Divorce (St James’s Place, London: Collins, 1979), David Atkinson articulates six principles “as basis for a Christian view of divorce in our contemporary society.” (p. 143, elaborated upon on the following pages)

“In attempting to apply these principles to our contemporary situation, three particular issues call for further comment.” (p. 151)

(a) Divorce is a moral act, not the result of ‘misfortune’

Atkinson critiques the Root Report, Marriage, Divorce and the Church (SPCK, 1972). “In contrast to the Eastern Orthodox insistence that the ‘permission for divorce in no way denies the tragic and sinful nature of every marriage breakdown’ [citing the Report, p. 121], the Root report (and indeed much of the way ‘irretrievable breakdown’ is currently understood) appears to transfer all question of blame for divorce away from the partners and to the ‘marriage’ as though (as D. Field comments) ‘the institution of marriage can be made into some kind of third party scapegoat on which all guilt can be laid’.” (p. 152)

He adds the observations that covenant breaches can be serious or relatively trivial and that “persistent and unrepentant sin is one thing; the action which, though of itself not morally good may none the less be right in the circumstances (like bearing arms in war), is quite another.” (p. 153).

This means that “although legally and socially in institutional terms all ‘divorcees’ are identical in that they were once married but are married no longer (and indeed the Church needs to recognize all civil decrees, even those granted on what from a theological standpoint it may regard as trivial grounds, as de facto divorces), in theological and pastoral terms this identity of ‘divorcees’ is not adequate.” (p. 153)

(b) Divorce as the ‘lesser evil’

“To initiate civil divorce procedure as the ‘lesser evil’ may sometimes be a responsible choice, but only with the recognition of sin, with sorrow and repentance.” (from the Summary, p. 174)

(c) Divorce: the legal procedures

“The legal procedures of the 1969 legislation in this country do not seem to fulfil the intentions of the authors of the Anglican Report Putting Asunder (1966) on which (largely) they were based. The present legal situation and court procedures are in fact making divorce easier and the maintenance of marriage harder.” (from the Summary, p. 174)

The issue of nullity is discussed on pp. 162-171. “Although some are urging the Church of England to follow the Church of Rome in exploring the possibilities of annulment in some cases of marital breakdown, it is sounder theologically and clearer in practice to recognize divorce, and to require the handling of even those ‘marriages’ which theologically may be deemed nullities to be the responsibility of civil courts.” (p. 175).

“Finally, what about the moral issues involved in the question of remarriage after divorce?

The possibility, indeed likelihood, of remarriage after divorce is presupposed in both Old and New Testaments, although, as we have seen, a second marriage falls under the cloud of the broken covenant of the first.” (p. 171)

“Our view is that it is not only remarriage which closes the door to all possibility of reconciliation and renewal. When that door has finally been shut by a determination of the will of either partner, there can be a freedom to remarry. But only if the door has been shut. Any children of the first marriage (almost invariably the chief casualties of divorce) are also of paramount importance, and the fulfilment of outstanding covenant obligations of parenthood towards them is another of the moral issues affecting the decision concerning remarriage.” (p. 172)

Atkinson also notes the importance of exploring and, if need be, addressing pastorally and maybe therapeutically “the question of personal ability to make and sustain committed relationships” (p. 172). Furthermore, one would need to judge “that the overall personal good of remarriage in a particular case would justify the threat that a second union would make to the social institution of marriage.” (p. 173).

See also notes from chapter 1 (areas of disagreement), chapter 2 (historical sketch), chapter 3 (marriage as covenant), chapter 4 (background and biblical evidence), and chapter 6 (pastoral questions).

To Have and to Hold: Divorce and Remarriage, Principles

David Atkinson, in the fifth chapter of To Have and to Hold: The Marriage Covenant and the Discipline of Divorce (St James’s Place, London: Collins, 1979), articulates six principles “as basis for a Christian view of divorce in our contemporary society.”

(a) In the teaching of Jesus we must reject any antithesis between an ‘ethic of law’ and an ‘ethic of disposition’: both belong together within ‘covenant ethics’.

(b) The ‘Father’s will’ for marriage has a general validity for all [people]. The ethical teaching of Jesus removes all limitation from the sphere of validity of divine law.

(c) The Messianic ‘gift of righteousness’ provides the possibility for the fulfilment of the Father’s will.

(d) We must be careful not to interpret the teaching of Jesus as a new law code by which the Father’s will is achieved.

(e) The New Testament speaks both of the Father’s will and of his concessions because of sin.

(f) We are not, therefore, to place the covenant ethic of the law of love which fulfils the Father’s will over against the juridical sphere of civil legislation.

Drawing these points together in the context of our discussion of divorce, therefore, we conclude that civil divorce legislation needs first to provide a context in which covenant love in the marriage relationship can flourish and be maintained: in which the harvest of the Spirit can grow (and therefore should provide sufficient barriers to easy divorce that divorce is never a first option, but always the tragic last resort); second, to provide for the maximising of support and aid in reconciliation for the hard times; and third, to regulate the ways in which marriage covenant may be terminated in line with the principles of order and justice.” (pp. 143-151)

Two further citations in the context of discussing the penultimate principle:

“By referring to creation (‘from the beginning it was not so’; Matt. 19:4; Mark 10:6), and by bringing divorce under the heading of the seventh commandment (Matt. 5:32), Jesus proclaims the Father’s will for marriage. By not rejecting the Mosaic ruling to regulate divorce, but regarding it as a concession because of ‘hardness of heart’ (Matt. 19:8), though none the less part of the law of God (the giving of a certificate was a ‘commandment’, Mark 10:5), and by his own words (‘Every one who divorces...’; ‘Let no man put asunder’), Jesus recognizes that the Father’s will may be thwarted by sin and that social regulation of divorce therefore becomes necessary.

                St Paul likewise distinguished between the will of God for permanence and the need for specific rulings if that will was not adhered to. The affirmation of the law of God for marriage cannot therefore be taken to imply that there is no place for legislation to regulate divorce within a sinful world.” (pp. 147-148)

“It has been the consistent view of theologians of the Reformed tradition (exemplified most clearly in Reformation times, perhaps, by Peter Martyr), that Christian thinking on the subject of divorce needs to hold two principles firmly together: the permanence of the marriage covenant in principle and divorce as a tragic, but real, exception. The essential moral force of Jesus’ affirmation of the will of God for marriage implies the following principles. First, that the permanence of marriage is not merely an ideal. Marriage is in fact a covenant in which permanence is not only possible, but indeed is part of the very meaning of what covenant is about. Secondly, divorce must therefore always be seen as sin or the result of sin, involving social evil as well as personal tragedy.” (p. 148)

A second set of notes from this chapter on the applications of these principles is here .See also notes from chapter 1 (areas of disagreement), chapter 2 (historical sketch), chapter 3 (marriage as covenant), chapter 4 (background and biblical evidence) and chapter 6 (pastoral questions).

To Have and to Hold: Marriage and Divorce

The summary of chapter 4 which examines the background and exegesis of the biblical material in David Atkinson, To Have and to Hold: The Marriage Covenant and the Discipline of Divorce (St James’s Place, London: Collins, 1979) reads as follows:

1. The Pentateuchal laws on premarital intercourse, incest and adultery were framed to preserve the view that in marriage, a man and wife are united in what is intended to be an exclusive lifelong union.
2. The legislation of Deut. 24:1-4 is the recognition of a permission (not prescription) for divorce, and gives legal conditions designed to reduce hasty divorce and minimize cruelty to the divorced wife. It thus recognizes the fact of marriage breakdown, and acknowledges the need for societal legislation to regulate divorce.
3. Post-exilic writers reaffirm the divine intention for the permanence of marriage.
4. Divorce is never encouraged or commanded in the Old Testament.
5. The Synoptic divorce material reflects the Pharisaic dispute about the interpretation of the Pentateuchal legislation. In Jesus’ day, the death penalty for adultery was not enforced. Gentile readers under Roman law would, like Jews, have assumed that divorce following adultery was legally required.
6. In the Synoptic material, Jesus reaffirms the divine law for the permanence of marriage, and brings divorce-with-remarriage under the seventh commandment against adultery.
7. Matthew’s porneia clause (meaning ‘unlawful sexual intercourse’) are most satisfactorily seen as expounding the significance of Deut. 24 in the context of Jesus’ day, and as indicating the continuing need for societal legislation to regulate divorce because of ‘the hardness of men’s hearts’.
8. The primary emphasis in Jesus’ teaching, however, is that in the will of God for marriage divorce has no place, and to initiate the ‘putting away’ of one’s spouse infringes the commandment against adultery.
9. In the teaching of Paul, we find the same two emphases: the law of God for the permanence of marriage, and the recognition that there are circumstances [in] which it is important to legislate for exceptions.
10. Both Testaments indicate that when divorce occurs (however wrongly), right of remarriage is presupposed; in other words, when a marriage has been broken, divorce dissolves the marriage ‘bond’ and covenant; the Bible does not know legal separation without the possibility of remarriage.

See also notes from chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 5 here and here, and chapter 6.

To Have and to Hold: The Marriage Covenant

Notes from David Atkinson, To Have and to Hold: The Marriage Covenant and the Discipline of Divorce (St James’s Place, London: Collins, 1979), see first post and notes from his historical sketch.

“The centre of the meaning of marriage (not what it is for, nor how it is made, but what it means) is the expression of a bond of moral troth (that is, covenant faithfulness) in which two people marry each other before God, and pledge to each other loyalty, trust, devotion and reliability.” (p. 85)

“Within a marriage covenant faithfulness will mean at least the following four things (following Smedes).”

• faithfulness to a vow
• faithfulness to a calling
• faithfulness to a person
• faithfulness to a relationship (pp. 85-87)

“If marriage is understood in covenant terms, then the possibility of divorce must be discussed as the possibility of breaking covenant. The covenant structure of marriage lends weight to the view, discussed earlier, that marriage is not a metaphysical status which cannot be destroyed; it is rather a moral commitment [to a permanent relationship] which should be honoured.” (p. 91)

“To understand divorce as a moral (rather than a metaphysical) question, however, allows us to consider whether and in what circumstances such a moral obligation as is undertaken in marriage may be overridden by other moral duties, and whether and in what circumstances, divorce may be considered the lesser evil.” (p. 92)

I have written up further notes from chapter 4 (background and biblical evidence), chapter 5 here (principles for a Christian view of divorce) and here (applications of these principles), and chapter 6 (pastoral questions).

To Have and to Hold: Historical Sketch

Notes from the historical sketch in David Atkinson, To Have and to Hold: The Marriage Covenant and the Discipline of Divorce (St James’s Place, London: Collins, 1979), see previous post. Emphases added. I have written up further notes from chapter 3 (marriage as covenant), chapter 4 (background and biblical evidence), chapter 5 here (principles for a Christian view of divorce) and here (applications of these principles), and chapter 6 (pastoral questions).

 “the evidence from the earliest centuries is open to difference in interpretation...even in Augustine, one of the clearest early exponents of the indissolubility of the marriage bond, the question arises especially (only?) for Christians, and is primarily one of moral impermissibility rather than one of ontological impossibility...

What is less open to difference of interpretation is the evidence that after the beginning of the sixth century there was a divergence between the Greek and Latin Churches on the possibility and therefore permissibility of divorce with right of remarriage...Some commentators regard this as a continuation of the position of some of the Fathers (Origen, Basil in particular) for whom the remarriage of divorced persons can be said to be justifiable in some cases as the lesser of two evils, although contrary to the Scriptural ideal for marriage. Others...who interpret Origen, Basil and others as in fact upholding the divine law of the indissolubility of marriage, regard the practice of the Eastern Church from the sixth century as an increasingly lax and inexcusable departure from this law.” (p. 43)

“As we have noted...at the time of the Fathers marriage was a bond of permanent moral obligation. By the time of the medieval schoolmen, indissolubility had come to mean in addition an ontological vinculum which could not be broken – at least in respect of consummated marriages of baptized believers. One can point to some relaxations of the absoluteness of this law in the intervening centuries, but the reforms of Hildegard at Cluny ended these concessions and (to quote Winnett),

The Decretum of Gratian, compiled shortly before the middle of the twelfth century, laid down that a consummated marriage admitted of no dissolution. The marriage bond could not be severed by adultery, and still less by other causes. Though separation for adultery was permitted, remarriage was forbidden. From the time of Gratian to the Reformation, the doctrine of indissolubility in the Western Church, at least in respect of the consummated marriage of Christians.

Marriages contracted by unbelievers were in certain cases capable of dissolution. Innocent III had at the end of the twelfth century embodied the ‘Pauline Privilege’ into the canonical legislation of the Church.” (pp. 44-45)

The continental Reformers abandoned the principle of absolute indissolubility upheld by the Western Churches during the Middle Ages for both theological and pastoral reasons. “And they believed that in doing so, they were recalling the Church to the Scriptural teaching on marriage and divorce. This is not to say that they abandoned the divine ideal of permanence in marriage, nor indeed failed to insist on it as a moral obligation...Rather, they upheld that ideal and that obligation very strongly. They did, however, allow that while the marriage bond should not be dissolved, there were Scriptural grounds on which dissolution should be legitimate though not mandatory, and the right of remarriage upheld. (Only a very few regarded divorce as mandatory in these circumstances.).” (p. 50).

“We can summarize the position of the Continental Reformers as best exemplified by Peter Martyr, therefore, in four main points. First, they upheld and proclaimed the divine ideal and moral obligation of the permanence of marriage. Second, they were united in holding the lawfulness of divorce a vinculo for adultery and malicious desertion (and a few extended the grounds to include cruelty (Luther), and even disease (Bucer)). Third, they believed that the jurisdiction of marriage discipline and divorce provisions should be in the hands of the State. Fourth, they believed that when a divorce was lawfully granted, this was coupled with right of remarriage.” (p. 57). [1] 

“Archbishop Cranmer’s attitude closely resembled that of Peter Martyr. The Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum, Cranmer’s proposed revised Canon Law which never reached Statute, permitted divorce with right of remarriage for adultery, malicious desertion, prolonged absence without news, attempts against the partner’s life, cruelty.” (p. 64)

Both [G. H.] Joyce [Christian Marriage (Sheed and Ward, 1948)] and much more fully [A. R.] Winnett [Divorce and Remarriage in Anglicanism (Macmillan 1958) and Divorce and the Church (A. R. Mowbray, 1968)] document the position from the end of the sixteenth century: ‘The Church of England officially committed to the old standards of law and practice concerning marriage, but side by side with this the opinion held by many influential Churchmen that adultery dissolved the marriage bond and that the innocent husband was free to remarry, an opinion which in a number of instances found expression in practice’ (by Special Acts of Parliament). That division of opinion on the question of absolute indissolubility has been characteristic of Anglican history ever since. Indeed, the Lambeth Conference of 1888 expressly noted that division [in Resolution 4(a)].” (p. 62)


[1] The study by H. J. Selderhuis, Marriage and Divorce in the Thought of Martin Bucer (Kirksville, Miss.: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1999) examines one of the most significant contributions of that time, putting it in context and including a discussion of reaction to Bucer’s ideas at the time.

To Have and to Hold: Conflicting Trends

Notes from David Atkinson, To Have and to Hold: The Marriage Covenant and the Discipline of Divorce (St James’s Place, London: Collins, 1979), a study “commissioned by the Latimer House Council to be a contribution to the current debate in the Church of England on the remarriage of divorced persons in church” (author’s note) at a time that the Church of England still banned remarriage after divorce, when a former partner was still living.

“Behind today’s pastoral questions lies a whole history of debate. The three central areas of difference are

(a) Alternative views about the nature of marriage. All are agreed that God’s will for marriage is that marriage ‘is in its nature a union permanent and lifelong, for better for worse, till death them do part, of one man with one woman, to the exclusion of all others on either side...’ [Canon B 30] The debate concerns whether a valid marriage once entered into on these terms can ever be broken in God’s sight. Is marriage ‘indissoluble’ in fact?

(b) Alternative views about divorce. All are agreed that divorce is a grievous departure from God’s will for marriage. But if a marriage cannot in fact be dissolved in God’s eyes, whatever the courts of the land may declare, how is the Church to view divorcees? If, however, marriage can in some circumstances be dissolved, what – before God – counts as marriage breakdown?

(c) Alternative views about the function of the Church. All are agreed that the Church shall witness to God’s truth both of his will for the permanence of marriage, and of the Gospel of grace and forgiveness. The difficulties come in trying to maintain the proper balance between its prophetic and pastoral responsibilities in its liturgical and disciplinary practice, against the background of differing views of ministry and sacraments.” (p. 11, emphasis added)

I have written up further notes from chapter 2 (historical sketch), chapter 3 (marriage as covenant), chapter 4 (background and biblical evidence), chapter 5 here (principles for a Christian view of divorce) and here (applications of these principles), and chapter 6 (pastoral questions).