In the fifth chapter of To Have and to Hold: The Marriage
Covenant and the Discipline of Divorce (St James’s Place, London: Collins,
1979), David Atkinson articulates six
principles “as basis for a Christian view of divorce in our contemporary
society.” (p. 143, elaborated upon on the following pages)
“In attempting to apply these principles to our contemporary
situation, three particular issues call for further comment.” (p. 151)
(a) Divorce is a moral act, not the result of ‘misfortune’
Atkinson critiques the Root Report, Marriage, Divorce and
the Church (SPCK, 1972). “In contrast to the Eastern Orthodox insistence
that the ‘permission for divorce in no way denies the tragic and sinful nature of
every marriage breakdown’ [citing the Report, p. 121], the Root report (and
indeed much of the way ‘irretrievable breakdown’ is currently understood)
appears to transfer all question of blame for divorce away from the partners
and to the ‘marriage’ as though (as D. Field comments) ‘the institution of
marriage can be made into some kind of third party scapegoat on which all guilt
can be laid’.” (p. 152)
He adds the observations that covenant breaches can be
serious or relatively trivial and that “persistent and unrepentant sin is one
thing; the action which, though of itself not morally good may none the less be
right in the circumstances (like bearing arms in war), is quite another.” (p.
153).
This means that “although legally and socially in
institutional terms all ‘divorcees’ are identical in that they were once
married but are married no longer (and indeed the Church needs to recognize all
civil decrees, even those granted on what from a theological standpoint it may
regard as trivial grounds, as de facto divorces), in theological and
pastoral terms this identity of ‘divorcees’ is not adequate.” (p. 153)
(b) Divorce as the ‘lesser evil’
“To initiate civil divorce procedure as the ‘lesser evil’
may sometimes be a responsible choice, but only with the recognition of sin,
with sorrow and repentance.” (from the Summary, p. 174)
(c) Divorce: the legal procedures
“The legal procedures of the 1969 legislation in this
country do not seem to fulfil the intentions of the authors of the Anglican
Report Putting Asunder (1966) on which (largely) they were based. The
present legal situation and court procedures are in fact making divorce easier
and the maintenance of marriage harder.” (from the Summary, p. 174)
The issue of nullity is discussed on pp. 162-171. “Although
some are urging the Church of England to follow the Church of Rome in exploring
the possibilities of annulment in some cases of marital breakdown, it is
sounder theologically and clearer in practice to recognize divorce, and to
require the handling of even those ‘marriages’ which theologically may be
deemed nullities to be the responsibility of civil courts.” (p. 175).
“Finally, what about the moral issues involved in the
question of remarriage after divorce?
The possibility, indeed likelihood, of remarriage after
divorce is presupposed in both Old and New Testaments, although, as we have
seen, a second marriage falls under the cloud of the broken covenant of the
first.” (p. 171)
“Our view is that it is not only remarriage which closes the
door to all possibility of reconciliation and renewal. When that door has
finally been shut by a determination of the will of either partner, there can
be a freedom to remarry. But only if the door has been shut. Any children of
the first marriage (almost invariably the chief casualties of divorce) are also
of paramount importance, and the fulfilment of outstanding covenant obligations
of parenthood towards them is another of the moral issues affecting the decision
concerning remarriage.” (p. 172)
Atkinson also notes the importance of exploring and, if need
be, addressing pastorally and maybe therapeutically “the question of personal
ability to make and sustain committed relationships” (p. 172). Furthermore, one
would need to judge “that the overall personal good of remarriage in a particular
case would justify the threat that a second union would make to the social
institution of marriage.” (p. 173).
