Notes from the historical sketch in David Atkinson, To
Have and to Hold: The Marriage Covenant and the Discipline of Divorce (St
James’s Place, London: Collins, 1979), see previous
post. Emphases added. I have written up further notes from chapter 3 (marriage as covenant), chapter 4 (background and biblical evidence), chapter 5 here (principles for a Christian view of divorce) and here (applications of these principles), and chapter 6 (pastoral questions).
“the evidence from
the earliest centuries is open to difference in interpretation...even in
Augustine, one of the clearest early exponents of the indissolubility of the
marriage bond, the question arises especially (only?) for Christians, and is
primarily one of moral impermissibility rather than one of ontological
impossibility...
What is less open to difference of interpretation is the
evidence that after the beginning of the sixth century there was a divergence
between the Greek and Latin Churches on the possibility and therefore permissibility
of divorce with right of remarriage...Some commentators regard this as a
continuation of the position of some of the Fathers (Origen, Basil in
particular) for whom the remarriage of divorced persons can be said to be
justifiable in some cases as the lesser of two evils, although contrary to the
Scriptural ideal for marriage. Others...who interpret Origen, Basil and others
as in fact upholding the divine law of the indissolubility of marriage, regard
the practice of the Eastern Church from the sixth century as an increasingly
lax and inexcusable departure from this law.” (p. 43)
“As we have noted...at the time of the Fathers marriage was
a bond of permanent moral obligation. By the time of the medieval schoolmen,
indissolubility had come to mean in addition an ontological vinculum
which could not be broken – at least in respect of consummated marriages
of baptized believers. One can point to some relaxations of the absoluteness of
this law in the intervening centuries, but the reforms of Hildegard at Cluny
ended these concessions and (to quote Winnett),
The Decretum of Gratian, compiled shortly before the middle of the twelfth century, laid down that a consummated marriage admitted of no dissolution. The marriage bond could not be severed by adultery, and still less by other causes. Though separation for adultery was permitted, remarriage was forbidden. From the time of Gratian to the Reformation, the doctrine of indissolubility in the Western Church, at least in respect of the consummated marriage of Christians.
Marriages contracted
by unbelievers were in certain cases capable of dissolution. Innocent III had
at the end of the twelfth century embodied the ‘Pauline Privilege’ into the
canonical legislation of the Church.” (pp. 44-45)
The continental Reformers abandoned the principle of
absolute indissolubility upheld by the Western Churches during the Middle Ages
for both theological and pastoral reasons. “And they believed that in doing so,
they were recalling the Church to the Scriptural teaching on marriage and
divorce. This is not to say that they abandoned the divine ideal of permanence
in marriage, nor indeed failed to insist on it as a moral obligation...Rather,
they upheld that ideal and that obligation very strongly. They did, however,
allow that while the marriage bond should not be dissolved, there were
Scriptural grounds on which dissolution should be legitimate though not
mandatory, and the right of remarriage upheld. (Only a very few regarded
divorce as mandatory in these circumstances.).” (p. 50).
“We can summarize the position of the Continental Reformers
as best exemplified by Peter Martyr, therefore, in four main points. First,
they upheld and proclaimed the divine ideal and moral obligation of the permanence
of marriage. Second, they were united in holding the lawfulness of divorce a
vinculo for adultery and malicious desertion (and a few extended the
grounds to include cruelty (Luther), and even disease (Bucer)). Third, they believed
that the jurisdiction of marriage discipline and divorce provisions should be
in the hands of the State. Fourth, they believed that when a divorce was
lawfully granted, this was coupled with right of remarriage.” (p. 57). [1]
“Archbishop Cranmer’s attitude closely resembled that of
Peter Martyr. The Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum, Cranmer’s proposed
revised Canon Law which never reached Statute, permitted divorce with right of
remarriage for adultery, malicious desertion, prolonged absence without news,
attempts against the partner’s life, cruelty.” (p. 64)
[1] The study by H. J. Selderhuis, Marriage and Divorce in the Thought of Martin Bucer (Kirksville, Miss.: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1999) examines one of the most significant contributions of that time, putting it in context and including a discussion of reaction to Bucer’s ideas at the time.
