"Prayers of Love and Faith"

This is my understanding of the story so far:

In what is presented as a significant move the Bishops of the Church of England will offer its clergy a variety of flexible ways to affirm and celebrate same-sex couples in church. The resource is intended as a loving and celebratory response to same-sex couples and will include prayers of dedication, thanksgiving and for God’s blessing.

The prayers will be entirely discretionary and have been formulated with legal advice to ensure that the formal teaching of the Church of England as set out in the canons and authorised liturgies – that Holy Matrimony is between one man and one woman for life – is not compromised.

In some (*) of our Church of England parish churches you will be able to have your same-sex (**) civil partnership or “marriage” (***) blessed (****). This offer is also open to couples in covenanted, non-registered friendships (*****).

(*) the prayers are offered in the knowledge that not all clergy will be able to use them in good conscience

(**) sexual relations between persons of the same sex cannot be condoned by the Church because the Scriptures declare extra-marital sex to be incompatible with being in God’s kingdom but clergy need not tell you that

(***) the marriage of two persons of the same sex is not capable of constituting a marriage for the purposes of ecclesiastical law, i.e., a civil marriage between members of the same sex is not a marriage in the eyes of the church

(****) your relationship cannot be blessed as such but we can ask God to bless you as a couple

(*****) these prayers are not intended for couples who are not of the same sex

There have been angry responses from those who consider the apology offered by the Bishops to LGBTQI+ people to be meaningless, while same-sex couples are not allowed to get married in Church.  

There have been angry responses also from those who believe that the resources to all intents and purposes change the Church's teaching on marriage and sexual morality.

Some are relieved that the Church has found a way to leave "holy matrimony" (marriage as understood by the Church) unchanged while affirming same-sex covenanted relationships, others are concerned that the "don't ask, don't tell" policy in relation to sexual intimacy outside marriage might make a return.

For some it is a time for celebrating our doctrinal diversity, for others it is a time of mourning our loss of integrity.

The Church will not split over gay sex

The Church of England will not split over gay sex.

If it splits, it will do so over the authority of Scripture. It is one of the failures of the LLF journey thus far that this is still barely understood. Many people believe that it is homophobia pure and simple that prevents progress in this area. After all, have we not long ceased to treat the Bible as the word of God, departing from it when we felt it was in need of correction? Why not do so now? Surely it is just bigotry that leads some to cling to the words of Scripture in the area of sexuality.

It is undeniable that there are many in the CofE, including many clergy, who do not consider the Bible to be the authoritative word of God in the way those did who wrote our Christian confessions of faith and devised our historic liturgies. A good few among them perhaps really do not realise that there are others within the CofE, including clergy, who still believe the Holy Scriptures to be ‘God’s word written’ (Article 20 of the 39 Articles) and who seek to submit to the teaching of the Bible, read carefully in the light of how it has been understood throughout church history (tradition) and informed by biblical scholarship (reason).

Some of those who have departed from this understanding of Scripture know that there are others within the CofE who have not done so but they expect that ‘traditionalists’ will continue to tolerate departures from Scripture within the CofE, given that they have done so in other areas, unless in this case their homophobia prevents it. This overlooks something crucial. To take one example, ‘revisionists’ may well allow for remarriage after divorce because they think of themselves as more compassionate than the sound of the words on the lips of Jesus in the Gospel but ‘traditionalists’ fall into two groups – a smaller one (I believe) who considers this wrong but tolerates it because the official teaching of the CofE is still that marriage is life-long and the liturgy has not been changed, and a larger one (I believe) who allow for remarriage after divorce in some circumstances because Jesus did, and who consider the twentieth century changes within the CofE a belated return to Scripture (belated, because all other reformed churches had done so during the Reformation period).  

It is true that ‘traditionalists’ by and large have been very tolerant within the last hundred years or so, as the CofE in practice abandoned conformity to a doctrinal standard, but this tolerance was facilitated by the absence of changes to the official teaching or liturgy of the church which enshrined a departure from, say, Article 20 of the 39 Articles. It would be a different matter if the teaching of the BCP had to be suspended to drop the diversity-sex requirement of marriage or if the claim that ‘no Christian man whatsoever is free from the obedience of the Commandments which are called Moral’ were qualified to make space for a sexual morality which is no longer circumscribed by Scripture.

It is not gay sex that will split the church; it is irreconcilable views about how we discern God’s will which will split the church if it splits.

Ashers Bakery

I am not a legal expert nor the son of a legal expert. These notes are merely by way of digesting the judgement that the court delivered in the Ashers Bakery case, based on the published summary.

The defendants are not a religious organisation; they are conduction a business for profit notwithstanding their genuine religious beliefs and in accordance with Regulations 16(2) are not therefore exempted by the Regulations.

To me this opening gambit sounds somewhat prejudicial because it suggests that the oweners or managers of Ashers Bakery claimed exemption from anti-discrimination law which I am pretty sure they did not. (Reading the full statement it makes more sense, as it is in effect a comment on the decision by the law-makers not to include a conscience clause for businesses.)

Judge Brownlie agreed with "the plaintiff's submission that same-sex marriage is or should be regarded as a union between persons having a sexual orientation" which I read as implying that those who enter into a "same-sex marriage" should be considered to have a "same-sex orientation" although I am not sure where this leaves bisexuals and others. More importantly, Judge Brownlie also agreed that "if a person refused to provide a service on that ground then they were discriminating on grounds of sexual orientation."

This has a certain logic but is it relevant? No-one claims that this business transaction fell through because the customer is in a same-sex marriage (we don't know that he is) and the managers of the Bakery repeatedly stressed that they serve all customers without discrimination.

Judge Brownlie appears to grant that the managers did not actually know that the customer was gay. But they had "the knowledge or perception" that Gareth Lee either is gay or at least "associated with others who are gay." With this the Judge appears to insinuate that the Bakery discriminates against customers who associate with gays which would be remarkable.

The Judge explains that

the defendants must have known that the plaintiff supported gay marriage and/or associated with others who supported gay marriage as this was a cake for a special event the plaintiff was attending

I would have thought that the message "Support Gay Marriage" which was to be put on the cake would have given the game away without any knowlegde of the event for which the cake was requested. But Judge Brownlie recognises that supporters of "gay marriage" are not necessarily gay and hence settles for the lesser claim that supporters of "gay marriage" can be presumed to associate with gays. In addition, she concludes that Karen McArthur, who served Gareth Lee, knew that "the plaintiff was a member of a small volunteer group; he wanted his own graphics on the cake" etc. In other words, the customer was thought to be in agreement with the message he wanted to have put on the cake.

Fair enough, but what exactly is the relevance of that? Does the Judge want to argue that the cake was refused not so much for the message it was intended to bear but because the customer was thought to agree with that message? Indeed, this seems to be where this is going. The argument at this point appears to be that the Bakery refused to bake this cake not because they could not support the political message the cake was to convey but because the manager "must either consciously or unconsciously have had the knowledge or perception that the plaintiff was gay and/or was associated with others who are gay."

How so? The critical point, as far as the Judge is concerned, seems to be that "the graphics being lawful and not contrary to the terms and conditions of the company" cannot themselves be considerd the grounds for refusing the cake; the ground must therefore lie in the Bakery's perception of the customer. Hence the claim that the Bakery did not discriminate against a political belief only but against a customer and that on the grounds of his sexual orientation. On a first reading of the summary, the reasoning seems to me hostile and torturous.

That the refusal also constituted discrimination against a political belief can be shown more readily by making the fair assumption that the Bakery would have been happy to provide a cake that spells "support marriage". In refusing to add the word "gay" the Bakery was restricting Gareth's Lee freedom to manifest his beliefs. What the defendants were asked to do may put limits on the manifestation of their own religious beliefs but this is necessary to protect "the rights and freedoms of the plaintiff...To do otherwise would be to allow a religious belief to dictate what the law is."

Judge Brownlie held that what the defendants were asked to do did not require them to support, promote or endorse any viewpoint.

The defendants are welcome to their religious beliefs but must not "manifest them in the commercial sphere if it is contrary to the rights of others." To use an analogy I have employed earlier, bakers are printers, not publishers. A publisher may refuse to promote books of a certain political or ideological bent but a printer presumably is not permitted to refuse business on the grounds that they do not want to promote what is being printed.

The judgement has no direct application to charities. It concerns the commercial sphere and the rights of customers on providers. The decision implies that the conscience of providers must not interfere with the freedom of customers. The second part of the judgement is therefore arguably not so much a victory of "gay rights" over "religious rights" but of consumer rights over any other considerations. The owners and managers of Ashers Bakery are free to commission a Hindu printer for a booklet that proclaims that "Jesus Christ is Lord!" and may request a flower arrangement which spells "only mixed-sex marriages are genuine marriages" from a florist who happens to be a member of QueerSpace.

PS: The full statement by the Court is now also available

Reading the Pastoral Guidance on Same Sex Marriage

The House of Bishops Pastoral Guidance on Same Sex Marriage has drawn fierce criticism (see TA for a round-up of reactions). Here is an attempt at a more sympathetic reading of the guidance. 

The guidance consists of a letter and a statement. From the letter I highlight two things. First, while we are not agreed as a church on how to respond to the introduction of same sex marriage, the House of Bishop is agreed that “the Christian understanding and doctrine of marriage as a lifelong union between one man and one woman remains unchanged.”

Secondly, the Bishops re-affirm that same-sex partnerships can embody crucial virtues and allow that there are questions about “the meaning, interpretation and application of scripture to which we all seek to be faithful.” The Bishops do not spell out what brought about the need to re-consider our doctrine of sexuality.  Two factors come to mind. One is that the link between sexual intercourse and procreation has been severed in our society as a result of more advanced means for (a) preventing pregnancies and (b) procreating without sexual intercourse. Another is “the lived experience of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered people” which suggegts the use of sexual activity for strengthening the bonds of friendship and love without the sort of sexual greed condemned in the Scripture. The greedy immorality of which, e.g., Ephesians 5 speaks is found within the LGBT community as well as outside it but not all sexually active same-sex relationships fall in this category.

The appendix to the letter (the statement) first spells out the Church of England’s teaching on marriage and homophobia. It then sets out the effect of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. The Bishops observe that

there will, for the first time, be a divergence between the general understanding and definition of marriage in England as enshrined in law and the doctrine of marriage held by the Church of England and reflected in the Canons and the Book of Common Prayer.

It could be argued that the increased frequency with which marriages end in divorce has also changed the general understanding of marriage in society but it has not yet changed the definition of marriage. It may well be that before long our society will see marriage as a long-term but temporary arrangement (different spouses for different phases of one’s life) but this is not yet the general understanding --people who enter into marriage do so in the hope that it will last for life--and certainly the church still insists that marriage is for life. Allowing for divorce does not as such redefine marriage if, as at present, divorce is understood to relate to something having gone wrong. 

Declaring sex/gender irrelevant for the purposes of marriage marks a major departure from the traditional understanding and definition of marriage. It is completely different from affirming that ethnicity is irrelevant. (Properly understood, sexual orientation is as irrelevant as ethnicity. What is relevant in the traditional understanding is that marriage couples a man and a woman, regardless of their sexual orientation or their ethnicity.)

The introduction of polygamy would not re-define marriage to the same extent. Even in polygamous societies each marriage covenant is between one man and one woman. The difference is the permission given, usually to men only, to enter into more than one such covenant, a permission which the catholic church never granted even in societies that did.

The Bishops then re-affirm that

the Church of England should not exclude from its fellowship those lay people of gay or lesbian orientation who, in conscience, were unable to accept that a life of sexual abstinence was required of them and who, instead, chose to enter into a faithful, committed sexually active relationship.

The reference to “a faithful, committed sexually active relationship” sets these relationships apart from, e.g., greed and adultery, even if these two rarely if ever lead to excommunication either. Same-sex marriage is not characterised as institutionalising sexual immorality but treated analogously to what the church’s response might have been if the government had liberalised the law to allow people to enter into more than one marriage covenant at the same time. 

If there was a serious commitment to sacramental discipline in the Church of England, this would be a most significant concession. Even with the Church of England being what it is Thurstan Stigand fears that it will make it very difficult to exercise pastoral care in accordance with the received understanding of sex and marriage. He may well be right. The omission of reference to the General Synod motion of November 1987 which affirms that “homosexual genital acts” fall short of the Christian ideal and are to be met “with a call to repentance and the exercise of compassion” could be significant. But it could be argued that the advice is consistent with general practice in the Church of England:

Those same sex couples who choose to marry should be welcomed into the life of the worshipping community and not be subjected to questioning about their lifestyle. Neither they nor any children they care for should be denied access to the sacraments.

In fact, the only group of people of which I am aware to be “subjected to questioning about their lifestyle” with the consequence of limited access to worshipping communities are paedophiles and this is done for the protection of our children more than as a means of pastoral care for the offenders. Are there many churches in which people are excluded from the sacraments in the hope of bringing them to turn away from a sinful lifestyle? No. Even so, turning a blind eye to same-sex marriage may be harder than turning a blind eye to domestic abuse, as the former is by its nature public. (It could be argued that we should be more concerned about greed and domestic abuse than sex outside marriage but to use sacramental discipline as a call to repentance for some sins but not others is difficult without a reasonably clear concept of “mortal sins” or their equivalent in Anglican theology.)

The pastoral guidance on “acts of worship following civil same sex weddings” reminds us that “same sex weddings in church will not be possible” and reaffirms that no services should be offered which would suggest that the church’s doctrine of marriage has changed. The new guidance is explicitly paralleled to the guidance following the introduction of civil partnerships. The difference is that being a party to a civil partnership is not in itself contrary to the doctrine of the Church of England, while being a party to a same-sex marriage is. The assumption is therefore

that any prayer will be accompanied by pastoral discussion of the church's teaching and their reasons for departing from it.

The reiteration of the phrase “services of blessing” is noteworthy. Chancellor Nigel Seed (and Revd Brian Lewis) argued that the 2005 pastoral statement, while prohibiting “services of blessing” allowed for services of prayer and dedication. The argument was not persuasive in the first place (see here) and will be harder to make now, as Nigel Seed based on the strict distinction between civil partnership and marriage. But it is clear that the House of Bishop did not want to give more detailed guidance.

The section on clergy and ordinands in particular has given rise to accusations of political naivety and the charge of hypocrisy and double standards. Let's assume for a moment the government had given us legal permission to enter into more than one marriage covenant at the same time. Surely we would not expect the House of Bishops to lead us in the direction of either excommunicating everyone who is party to more than one marriage or to ignore the number of marriages in which ordination candidates or members of the clergy are involved. Just because something is legally possible would not mean that clergy are free to avail themselves of the opportunity. 

It is defensible to restrict admission to the choir to people who are prepared to sing in tune and with the tempo indicated my the director of music without requiring everyone in the congregation who sings out of tune to shut up. The choir is to give a lead. Clergy are to model a pattern of life which agrees with the teaching of the church. This places a burden on clergy who are convinced that the church's teaching is wrong, even if

The Church of England will continue to place a high value on theological exploration and debate that is conducted with integrity. That is why Church of England clergy are able to argue for a change in its teaching on marriage and human sexuality, while at the same time being required to fashion their lives consistently with that teaching.

 This can lead to hypocrisy, as Michael Nazir-Ali fears, but it does not seem to me entirely impossible to uphold the church's teaching, to fashion one's life in accordance with it, and even to preach it, while questioning its validity. If the church prohibited the eating of halal meat, I could abstain from eating halal meat and encourage the congregation to do so, while arguing that it is an unnecessary restriction which should be lifted.

Cranmer is right to say that "it is not what Canon Law prohibits in theory but how the bishops handle disobedience in practice which will determine and define the Church's theology on same-sex marriage" and he is likely also right to anticipate no end to bad publicity (and worse) along this road. But it is possible that the House of Bishops went down this road not naively but because they could not go down any other road with integrity.