Sunday, 26 January 2014

Excruciating Christianity

How do you like your Christianity?

Ordered, spontaneous, learned, heart-warming, traditional, experimental, moral, or choral?

Excruciating is likely not how you want it.

"Excruciating" comes from the Latin excruciare "to torture, torment, afflict, harass" which was formed from cruciare "to cause pain or anguish," literally "to crucify" (from crux, "cross") to which was added the prefix ex- which is here used in the sense of "thoroughly".

The apostle Paul ask the Corinthian church: Is Christ divided? (1 Corinthians 1:13)

If so, that should be painful - "painful" as in "thoroughly painful". If we don't feel the pain, we have lost our senses.

When does Christianity become excruciating? When the cross of Christ is taken out of it, taken the prefix ex- in its other sense as "out".

On the cross the power of God's love was shown to be greater than our love for power. Where the cross is pushed aside, the love of power takes hold in the church and divides it.

The cross is a place of shame and dishonour. Cicero: "The very word ‘cross’ should be far removed not only from the person of a Roman citizen but from his thoughts, his eyes and his ears." (Pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo 5.16). Where the cross is pushed aside, the love of prestige takes hold in the church and divides it.

Christ's cross is the place of reconciliation, between God and us and between people. Where the cross is pushed aside, enmities remain and the church is divided.

When the cross (crux) is taken out of (ex) Christianity, Christ is divided, Christianity becomes excruciating.

Saturday, 25 January 2014

The Silence of Jesus



The Pilling Report notes: “On two things concerning Scripture and sexuality, almost everyone is agreed: the Bible contains no positive depictions of, or statements about, sexual activity between people of the same sex, and Jesus himself is not recorded as mentioning the subject at all. But the significance of these two facts, and of other questions of scriptural interpretation on the subject, is deeply contested” (par. 220).

There are general hermeneutical reasons why one might be reluctant to appeal to the silence of Jesus in favour of revising the Church’s teaching on this or any issue. Anglicans are not known to be “red-letter Christians” even if the Gospels are privileged over other parts of Scripture; pro-slavery campaigners have used the argument from the silence of Jesus; it is specious to argue from silence to approval (cf. Ps. 50:21).

By and large, those who argue that the teaching of the Church on sexual ethics should remain unchanged believe that the silence of Jesus (in the Gospels) is of little consequence because Jesus affirms sexual immorality as evil, locating this evil in the heart (Mark 7:21-22), while giving us no reason to believe that his understanding of what constitutes sexual immorality differs from that of the book of Leviticus or the Jewish people around him. Evangelicals, but not only evangelicals, may want to add that the risen Christ continued to speak and did in fact have more to say on sexual immorality once the pagan world came into greater view, e.g., through the letters of Paul to the Romans and the Corinthians.

But those who seek to revise the Church’s teaching arguably have even less reason to make much of the silence of Jesus. If affirmation of gay sex is a matter of justice, as is often argued, it has either become a matter of justice more recently or it has always been a matter of justice, albeit maybe only more recently recognised as such.

If the former, the silence of Jesus can be excused, maybe on the grounds that LGBT people were not oppressed in the first-century Jewish context in which Jesus taught. There would have been therefore no need for Jesus to speak up for them.

If the latter, the silence of Jesus is embarrassing. If he who came to set the captives free (Luke 4:18) said nothing to liberate people from heterosexism, he must have had a massive blind spot, if heterosexism was as prevalent and damaging then as it is felt to be now.

Either way, it is difficult to see how the silence of Jesus can further the case for changing attitudes to full sexual expressions between members of the same sex. Maybe better keep silent about the silence of Jesus.

In truth, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that appeal to the silence of Jesus is a smokescreen. Are those who consider the silence of Jesus on this matter significant the same people who are keen to abide by the words of Jesus on divorce and remarriage? This is not my impression. Those who argue for a liberalisation of sexual ethics usually favour a more liberal approach to divorce and remarriage as well and indeed appeal to it for proof that the Church can change its teaching.



Evangelicals in the Pilling Report



The working group on human sexuality which published the Pilling Report included an evangelical Bishop who published a dissenting statement. The majority within the working group thought that the Bishop of Birkenhead reads Scripture “independently of the Church’s traditions and of human reason” and this is seen as characteristic of the evangelical wing of the Church.

Keith Sinclair rightly demurs. Whence this misunderstanding? Hooker is cited in the Report as affirming that “what Scripture doth plainly deliver, to that the first place both of credit and obedience is due” (par. 281). This goes a little further than approaching Scripture “with the utmost seriousness” (par. 233). It may be that such going further, with Hooker, is now thought to reflect a specifically “evangelical” view of the authority of Scripture but it is not perfectly evident that the majority of the working group wants to distance itself from Hooker in this way.

I nevertheless raise this as a possibility because it could be argued that the very claim that Scripture is clear on this, or any other issue, might be seen as threatening the alleged Anglican genius for juggling Scripture, Tradition and Reason. Where Scripture is clear, there is no need for an elaborate appeal to tradition and reason. This could then look like a reading of Scripture “independently of the Church’s traditions and of human reason.” Since the view presented by Keith Sinclair is in line with tradition and his exegesis rationally argued, it is still an odd claim to make but it might explain why the group considered it important “to include in the Appendices two essays on the Scriptures and homosexuality” by two men who would both “identify themselves as evangelicals within the Church of England” and “believe they are taking a high view of the authority of Scripture” (par. 223).

The two contributions are likely meant to “epitomize the way in which study of the same sources can lead to very different conclusions” even among those “taking a high view of the authority of Scripture” (par. 223). Christina Beardsley comments:

It’s a rather limited aim, though consistent with the ethos of polarisation that the working group is keen to insist is prevalent in the Church at large as well as in its midst. What is needed, though, at this point is precisely a wide range of evidence, especially gay, lesbian and queer theology, so that this case can be heard. The brief literature review, paragraphs 227-232, is woefully inadequate in this respect, and I would commend The Gay Gospels by my fellow Changing Attitude, England Trustee, Dr Keith Sharpe, for a comprehensive and succinct account of non-heterosexist readings of these passages.

Maybe the working group wanted to avoid characterising this as primarily a debate about the authority of Scripture. The debate about same-sex relationships is of course also a debate about the authority of Scripture and this is acknowledged in the Report. But by privileging readings that ostensibly come from the same stable, the working group may have hoped to demonstrate that there is a debate to be had about what the Bible teaches even among those who come to the text with a high view of Scripture as the authoritative and trustworthy word of God.

Among supporters of Changing Attitude this strategy is felt as excluding, apparently because it privileges those who emphasise our responsibility to listen to Scripture and obey over against those who stress our need to be ethical in our use of Scripture. Christina Beardsley, however, does not specify in what ways David Runcorn’s contribution falls short.

We should seek to listen with care to hear what God says to us through his Word and submit to it with joy. We should also be concerned that our use of Scripture like all of our life fulfils the commandment to love God and our neighbour. The Report may have missed an opportunity to ascertain whether we are agreed on these two principles or not, even allowing for differences in emphasis.

Supporters of Changing Attitude readily decry literalism and bibliolatry. The latter is what Keith Sinclair is accused of in one of the responses: “He wants to ‘set out the whole attractive biblical vision for the ordering of human relationships.’ (Attractive? Not to gays it isn’t. It’s toxic).” I suspect that the commenter does not want to characterise the biblical vision itself as toxic, rather Sinclair’s presentation of it, but the following paragraph suggests that treating “the authority of scripture” as “a first-order issue” is part of the problem. It is possible that the charge of “bibliolatry” would cover anyone who is seen to be privileging conformity of our experience to Scripture over against conformity of our reading of Scripture to our experience.

For Colin Coward himself the Report demonstrates that “Christianity is in thrall to literalist faith” and another comments that the Report “is naive in its use of Scripture.” Such comments could  suggest that the disagreement is not so much about the authority of Scripture than it is about what constitutes good hermeneutics. But the comments provide no evidence for a concern that the Church may be too cavalier in its use of Scripture. A warning against failing to submit to all that the Bible, taken as a coherent whole, teaches would be as unexpected here as an evangelical warning the Church against taking Scripture too seriously.

So a dividing line between those who wish to privilege the biblical text and those who wish to privilege the ethical reader is discernible. Christina Beardsley is worried that the selection of two evangelicals to represent the diversity of Biblical interpretation gives undue prominence to the part of the Church that stresses humility before the Word of God. I read the Report differently.

It is true that the working group does not give an equal voice to those who argue that we should not necessarily submit to what the Bible teaches. While the majority slightly distances itself from “a high view of the authority of Scripture,” this is done only implicitly and while asserting in the same breath a lack of clarity on what the Bible teaches, thus leaving the door open to the claim that we would submit to Biblical teaching if only we knew what it is.

The choice of two evangelicals to discuss the biblical evidence ostensibly privileges “a high view of the authority of Scripture,” but at the same time undermines it by suggesting that such a view is the property of one wing of the Church, not the birthright of the whole Church.

Evangelicals will want to stress that a submissive stance to Scripture and a concern to let our use of the Bible be an expression of love are not two opposite poles - far from it.  But the danger of focusing on submission to certain parts of Scripture in ways which neither do justice to Scripture nor express love to our neighbour is real.

Most evangelicals stress that the Scriptures consistently condemn gay sex without qualification and do so in an environment of more permissive cultures around them. They are also by and large sceptical of the claim that loving and stable homosexual relationships are only to be found in recent times. For this reason they fail to see how the Church can change its teaching on sexual behaviour without compromising itself. At the same time, most evangelicals stress that acts are condemned, not same-sex orientation or loving relationships between members of the same sex.

Nevertheless, the impression is often left that people who experience same-sex attraction are tainted. This is what LGBT people report. There has been little discussion that I am aware of among those affirming Biblical limits to sexual behaviour as to whether same-sex attraction is a handicap or a different giftedness (cf. the quotation from Eve Tushnet in a previous post). If the former, this calls for greater compassion. If the latter, we should explore ways of affirming and celebrating same-sex orientation without endorsing sexual behaviour which is condemned in the Bible.

It is true that it would be easier to have this discussion in the Church if we were all agreed on the authority of Scripture and on abiding by the limits to sexual behaviour set out therein. But the fact that some will insist that they will not feel welcomed and affirmed until some of the traditional limits are lifted should not prevent those who believe that Scriptural teaching on sexual behaviour is clear from exploring the broader issues of desire and identity.



The suggestion that affirming a high view of Scripture is a specifically evangelical concern is troubling in both directions. The authority of Scripture should not be a primarily evangelical concern but neither should evangelicals accept that being gatekeepers of Scriptural teaching is their role if it means neglecting reflection on those issues that are not directly addressed in the Bible.





Friday, 24 January 2014

Scripture, Tradition and Reason in the Pilling Report



The working group on human sexuality which published the Pilling Report “met with many respondents across the spectrum of viewpoints who radiated great certainty on many aspects of the subject.” But, the authors observe, “wherever we have turned – whether to Scripture, theology, science, or social trends – we have encountered divided views, sincerely and prayerfully held. Any suggestion, therefore, that the arguments are so conclusive that further discussion of the issues is no longer necessary does not do justice to the integrity of the theological convictions that are held or to the significant areas of scientific uncertainty that persist” (par. 68).

The dissenting statement by the Bishop of Birkenhead rightly observes that this “leaves the impression that the Church has no reason to believe the Church’s traditional teaching” (par. 449).

Where does this uncertainty come from? It may be related to different views of Scripture and particularly its relation to “tradition” and “reason” and specifically with different definitions of “reason”. The Report quotes Richard Hooker at two critical points and helps us to appreciate the difference between his take on the relationship between Scripture, tradition and reason and the one frequently promoted in the Church of England under the banner of the three-legged stool.

When Hooker speaks of “reason” he refers “to the human capacity for rational thought” exercised “in order to understand and apply the teaching of the Scriptures” (using the Report’s words in par. 296). Not only is this different from the way “reason” is appealed to today but, as I have hinted in the previous post, the very idea that one might decide on the validity of different readings by way of appeal to reason in this sense is threatened by a tendency to privilege sincerity over evidence and logic.

What is meant by “reason” today? “Reason also refers to the moral awareness that human beings possess because of their creation in the image and likeness of God and the way that this awareness is expressed in the moral convictions of particular cultures” (par. 297).

This does not merely take into account that reason is more “tradition constituted” (Alasdair MacIntyre, quoted in par. 298) than Hooker likely recognised but transforms “reason” from an instrument which is necessary for understanding Scripture to an alternative source of insight.

Is this a matter of allowing our growing understanding of God’s world to inform our understanding of God’s Word? If so, this would hardly be controversial in the Church of England. It is the proposal to put the strand of Reason understood as scientific knowledge and community consciousness “alongside” Scripture which has greater potential to set apart one view of Scripture from the other.

The use of “alongside” in the Pilling Report may signal a departure from Hooker. Nevertheless, the Report counsels against treating strands in isolation and recommends that “we are to exercise reason in order to illuminate God’s self-revelation to which Scripture bears primary witness, in order that it may be rendered the more deeply intelligible and received afresh in every generation. Tradition assists us to see how the Church, the community of faith, has read, received and understood the texts; thus it enables us to hear the Living Word speaking through the written word” (par. 301).

Even so, “the three elements of Scripture, Tradition and Reason are emphasized differently by distinct traditions within the Church itself” (par. 302) and this is one source of disagreement. “The current travails within Anglicanism on the subject of sexuality can be understood in part as a fundamental struggle to allow Scripture, tradition and reason to take their proper place in the quest to formulate a viable ethic. This is taking place in a Church which does not agree what the proper place of each of the three elements should be and in a wider culture where notions of sexuality and sexual behaviour are changing rapidly and are also hotly contested” (par. 304).


Paragraph 317 hints that one disagreement relates to whether Scripture is primary in the sense of being the first source of authority or whether it is also “the final source of authority to which both tradition and reason must be subordinated.” But the Report is not sufficiently clear to conclude with confidence that the authors discern a difference between “first” and “first and final” authority. There is a hint of such a difference in the earlier use of “starting point” (par. 301) and the preference for the qualifier “primary” over “final” whenever the authority of Scripture is in view but ambiguities remain.




While the majority apparently wants to distance itself from the view that “tradition and reason must be subordinated” to Scripture, it also seems offended by the suggestion that if one does not subordinate tradition and reason to Scripture, “Scripture is being treated as an equal dialogue partner with other perspectives.” What a co-ordinated inequality of the dialogue partners Scripture, Tradition, and Reason would look like remains unclear.

The working group accuses Keith Sinclair of reading Scripture “independently of the Church’s traditions and of human reason” (par. 318). I found this such a bizarre and unlikely claim that I had to read the paragraph several times to establish that this claim must lie behind the phrases “a single view of Scripture” and “this single perspective of Scripture”. Keith Sinclair’s later denial of this as a fair characterisation of his view (par. 462) confirms that the working group had indeed come to this conclusion about the view presented by the Bishop of Birkenhead.

This appears to offer the grounds for the fears that following Keith Sinclair’s argument “would, in effect, make one wing of the Anglican family the sole arbiter of Anglican ethics and bring an end to the conciliar approach which has for so long characterized Anglicanism” (par. 318).

Now, the Bishop of Birkenhead clearly does not ignore tradition, nor the use of reason in the sense in which Richard Hooker understood it. Furthermore, I see no reason to conclude that he would distance himself from the process outlined in par. 334 for engaging “Reason” (in the second definition), maybe with the exception of the final two sentences. I exclude these because I do not find their meaning perfectly clear. Maybe they are stating the obvious, that the Church must pay attention to more than scientific evidence, in which case Keith Sinclair would surely agree. But maybe they hint at “an encounter with the Holy Spirit” through cultural trends (cf. par. 337-344) with which Keith Sinclair would likely not agree. 

The working group tries hard to differentiate between hearing the Holy Spirit speak to us “through the shifts in popular culture” (par. 344) and simply conforming to the dominant culture of our time and place, albeit without offering much help for distinguishing between the work of the Spirit and human sinfulness. This would seem to be pretty important, given that most of us can testify in our own lives to the co-existence of both right next to each other.

The fact that we can discern the work of the Spirit in our lives obviously does not mean that all we do and say is holy. The fact that we are still tainted by sin does not mean that the Holy Spirit is not at work in us. What is true for us individually, is surely true for our society.